From jxxl Sun Jul 16 10:24:34 PDT 1995 Article: 49392 of alt.conspiracy.jfk Xref: netcom.com alt.fan.oj-simpson:43001 alt.conspiracy.jfk:49392 Newsgroups: alt.fan.oj-simpson,alt.conspiracy.jfk Path: netcom.com!jxxl From: jxxl@netcom.com (John Locke) Subject: A Bad Case of Deja Vu Message-ID: Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest) Date: Mon, 10 Jul 1995 23:36:45 GMT Lines: 371 Sender: jxxl@netcom.netcom.com A Bad Case of Deja Vu by John Locke Copyright (c) 1995 John Locke The O.J. Simpson extravaganza--this decade's Trial of the Century--bears much, too much, in common with the controversy sur- rounding that Crime of the Century candidate, the JFK assassination. A comparison of the phenomena shows that history, while not repeating itself too precisely, still reverberates with uncannily similar patterns. By the simple facts, the two crimes resemble each other: two victims, one suspect. One victim was the intended, the other an unlucky individual who crossed paths with the killer. Ronald Goldman was the person who happened to be returning a misplaced pair of glasses when Simpson's ex-wife, Nicole Brown, was killed. Patrolman J.D. Tippit, the often forgotten man of November 22, 1963, stopped the accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, for routine questioning an hour after the assassination and was shot to death. Were it not for one key factor, both double homicides would have been quickly muscled off the front pages by some other tawdry tale competing for attention. The driving force behind public interest in these cases owes, of course, to the station of the principals. President Kennedy was perhaps the most famous and admired murder victim we have known; football fave turned sports announcer, Simpson, is undoubtedly the most famous (and admired) accused murderer to date. Fame, arising from the simultaneous interest of so many, holds a magnifying glass to the event in question. Small matters, other- wise of interest to few, are suddenly of interest to everyone. Trivialities are promoted to significant issues, like whether Oswald, minutes after the assassination, bought a Coke from a soda machine. Or whether Nicole's melted ice cream contained lumps of raw cookie dough. As the initial shock of the crime fades, and perspectives narrow, the guilt or innocence of the accused can be seen to rest on such minutiae. Those with the wherewithal to study the cases in depth will, presumably, decide them on the merits; but most people, lacking either time, inclination, or access to the raw materials of evidence, fit what they hear into their conception of how society works. Opinions and opposing camps form, creating, in essence, an under-informed jury of millions all grinding away on the same problem. It is in the sides taken and the arguments advanced for them that we see the deeper similari- ties between the two cases. The natural alignment is with either the prosecution or the defense or, to generalize since Oswald never stood trial, the accusers or the defenders. The accusers represent authority. As collectors and guardians of the evidence, they possess an inherent advantage in judg- ing the case. Therefore, it's natural that people who trust authority assume that if a charge is made it is probably true. The defenders, believing the charge to be false must, necessarily, distrust authority, with any reason above unabashed cynicism satisfying the impulse to objectivity. In the circumstances of both the Oswald and Simpson cases, doubts flourish in fertile grounds. The JFK assassination occurred in a Cold War climate of hos- tile superpowers and nuclear threat. Suspicions were heightened when Oswald's previous defection to the Soviet Union and stateside commu- nist activism came to light. His own violent death the Sunday morning following the assassination smelled of a silencing, further intensifying suspicion. As the controversy moved into its second decade, revela- tions about government corruption in Watergate and the conduct of the Vietnam War sustained the fear that the Warren Commission, appointed by the new president to investigate the assassination, intentionally skirted evidence of conspiracy. The Simpson case, with a black defendant, a white victim, and a criminal justice system perceived by blacks as biased against them, splits attitudes about the case along generally racial lines, as numerous opinion polls have affirmed. African-Americans have a profound suspi- cion of authority justified by a history of shabby treatment by law enforcement. The violent backlash against the acquittal of police offic- ers who beat black motorist, Rodney King, demonstrates how active that suspicion remains, particularly in Los Angeles. Attempts at proving either the accusers' or defenders' case proceed from the initial disposition toward authority. The evidence against Oswald includes a rifle he owned discovered soon after the assassination at his place of employment, his prints on the rifle, a ballis- tic match between the rifle and a bullet from the shooting, and more of the usual grist of murder cases. Trusting the authorities and the evi- dence leads to the simple theory that Oswald, knowing the President would pass by, took his gun to work, shot him from a window, fled the scene, then shot Tippit fearing apprehension. The evidence against Simpson includes Simpson's blood at the murder scene appearing to have dripped from a cut on his finger, blood of the victims in his Ford Bronco, bloody evidence at Simpson's house, and so forth, leading to the simple theory that Simpson drove to his ex-wife's condo, killed her, killed Goldman when he stumbled upon the scene, and returned home. Both cases are much richer in detail, of course, but the basic theories are straightforward. For the defenders to prevail, things must be shown to be not what they seem. They must show the accusers' picture of the crime as a photographic negative that inverts its colors, black to white and vice versa. The accusers subsume the evidence within a single theory, the defenders seek to establish that anything but that theory is more likely. It's not surprising, therefore, that a multitude of theories have been advanced against the government's finding that Oswald alone commit- ted the crimes. Kennedy's death has been blamed on government agents, Cubans for and against Castro, gangsters, bankers, oil tycoons, and others. Names of prominent people, witnesses in the case, or known criminals often figure in. Indeed, with interest in the case still active, new theories continue to emerge. The Simpson case rivals this phenomenon. Alternative killers include the Mafia, gamblers, and Colombian "drug lords." Witnesses like Simpson getaway pal, A.C. Cowlings, bungalow dweller, "Kato" Kaelin, and Nicole's friend, Faye Resnick, have all played prominent roles in various theories. Another approach has been to shift the focus of the theory away from Simpson's relationship with his ex-wife. For example, it has been suggested that Ron Goldman was the prime target and Nicole the innocent bystander, mirroring the assassination theory that Texas governor John Connally, also wounded in the attack, was the target and that JFK simply got in the way. Since these theories typically ignore most of the hard evidence in the case, they are ephemeral, flit- ting about like moths for a brief period before dying. Since murders did occur, the alternative to lone killer can't be no killer. It can't be some other lone killer, because that raises the ques- tion, if only one, why not the defendant? So there must have been a conspiracy. Conspiracy makes for an alluring theory. Conspiracies are secretive by definition and secret groups are scary, like other invisible demons that erupt from the imagination. Conspiracies have the means to be insidiously clever that access to underworld coffers or the govern- ment treasury might permit. And the commonly suspected conspirato- rial groups come pre-packaged with institutional motives like protecting large vested interests, self-concealment, or subverting democracy. As a defender, posing conspiracy as a counter-theory requires holding a delicate balance. On one side, the theory satisfies the proposi- tion that anyone but the accused may be guilty. On the other, being too specific about any particular theory betrays that virtue of open-minded- ness cherished by proselytizers. If the theory begins to fit the evidence, the defender is recast as an accuser with pretense to the authority dis- trusted in the first place. It therefore behooves the conspiracist to keep to vague appeals about what is "obvious," shame opponents with accu- sations of naivete or servility, and not short-circuit the theory by devel- oping it to the point of self-contradiction. But, while remaining vague, the conspiracist must also avoid the tendency toward runaway theory expansion. The more conspirato- rial acts there are to explain, the more conspirators the theory requires, and the greater our skepticism the plot could stay secret. Oliver Stone's conspiracy film, "JFK," insinuated so many players--from sleazy low- lifes right up to the President and Chief Justice--Stone's name has become synonymous with paranoia. Simpson defender, Johnny Cochran, appeared headed down the same path when he blamed "big brother" for the nationwide trailing and harassment of defense wit- nesses, the blocking of a defense expert from publishing in a scientific journal, and targeting jurors for dismissal. If what remains after omitting any specificity is a rather weakly supported position, the accusers' theory must be characterized as even weaker. Thus, a criticism of the Warren Commission was titled after the old phrase, "Rush to Judgment," the point being that Oswald's guilt was based upon the first impressions that induce the "things are not what they seem" test. It's no coincidence the phrase, test marketed by the sixties best-seller, has been monotonously repeated by Simp- son's "Dream Team" of defense attorneys who, replacing conspiracy authors in the equation, provide nominal leadership to the controversy. Ultimately, though, the defenders must confront the incrimi- nating evidence, either in court or through the public debate. To that end, identical methods have been used to discredit similar evidence in both the Oswald and Simpson cases. For example, both accused mur- derers have a history of violent behavior. Oswald's included domestic abuse, a self-inflicted bullet wound, an attempted suicide, and the attempted assassination of a Dallas political figure earlier in 1963. Defenders of Oswald have either ignored, excused, or charged these incidents as fabrications. Likewise, Simpson's attorneys fought hard to exclude evidence of domestic violence from his trial; they've attempted to soften the issue by pushing phrases like "domestic discord"; and they've misrepresented his 1989 domestic abuse arrest as a singular event, ignoring other known incidents that didn't leave an arrest record. In another parallel, the physical ability of the accused to com- mit the crime has been disputed. Oswald's defenders have sought to establish that he was a poor shot and that the timing of the shots was too tight for one shooter, notwithstanding his Marine Corps qualifica- tions and other valid analyses of the timing. Similarly, Simpson's arthritis has been cited to disqualify him as a suspect despite his obvi- ous physical stature and athleticism. Another difficulty for the defenders is that Oswald and Simp- son lack solid alibis. Oswald was seen by familiars at times before and after the assassination but not during. Likewise for Simpson. Rebuttal tactics include shrinking the window of opportunity. A cop's estimate of seeing Oswald ninety seconds after the assassination was used to argue the impossibility of his having been where the shots originated. Simpson himself reduces his opportunity by claiming to have been in the shower (or playing golf) when the limousine driver was buzzing the house. Simpson also benefits from difficulties related to determining time of death, allowing the issue to be further obscured. Oddball eyewitnesses figure prominently in defenders' claims, providing dramatic rebuttal to the mute tyranny of physical evidence. The perverse value of these witnesses is that they draw their contribu- tions predominantly from memory, which is far less reliable than we usually suppose and thus capable of creating any convenient fiction. Worse still, pride may transform memories into convictions the harder they are challenged, as in cross-examination. Then the accusers are up against the unwritten rule that says if a person staunchly insists on their memories, there must be some truth in them. Over the decades, hun- dreds, if not thousands, of witnesses have come forward to say they know something, saw something, or even took part in the JFK assassi- nation, offering themselves to the controversy in acts of fervent sacri- fice. Many have written books or had their service to the cause canonized. In only one case did any of these fortune-hunters or atten- tion-seekers tell their stories under oath, with disastrous results. That was New Orleans D.A. Jim Garrison's 1969 attempt to convict some- one--anyone--of plotting to kill JFK. It's enough to note the jury's acquittal followed a forty-five minute deliberation. Including bathroom breaks. In a relatively short time, the Simpson case has made equally colorful contributions to our legal annals. A great many people have already come forward to tell their tales, on television, in books, or in court. Like the assassination witnesses before them, Simpson witnesses have been swallowed whole, digested and discarded, as the public appetite for sensation hunts new sustenance. An unlucky few--Rosa Lopez, Kathleen Bell, Mary Ann Gerches, Max Cordoba, etc.--have fallen into the clutches of the Dream Team, and seem less the better for it. It's one thing to testify before a Larry King-type, where any answer will pass, and another to face a hostile lawyer from the witness box. Sadly, at last, the less reliable these witnesses are, the less likely they are to be taken seriously by authorities, and the more likely they are to become martyrs to the charge that honest citizens were ignored in the rush to judgment. When things are not what they seem. The heart of any prosecution case is likely to be evidence developed by the many specialists--detectives, criminalists, coroners, etc.--who process the raw materials of the case. When the accused is guilty, it is not remarkable that a great amount of the evidence points his way. It is also not remarkable that the experts called upon to testify by the prosecution tell stories dovetailing with the accusers' theory. This is where the road meets the rubber. The very consistency of the testimony plays to the broader theme that authority has been corrupted across the board. For the accused to be innocent while the avalanche of evidence tumbles over him, then all the specialists must be lying, whether through wink or design, and that is deep corruption, indeed. Oswald's defenders, or the government's attackers--the appro- priate label is not always clear--were aided immeasurably in their attempts to exonerate Oswald and discover widespread corruption by the massive twenty-six volume set of evidence published by the Warren Commission in their desire to be as open as possible. The breadth of this material--expert and eyewitness testimony, documentary evidence, photographs, etc.--assisted critics of the Commission in scouring the record for discrepancies between witnesses, discrepancies in the notes, reports or statements of law enforcement officers, doctors, and other specialists. A good editor could probably retell the story of creation with quotes excised from the Commission's material, but Oswald's defenders chose to tell the story they most wanted to hear, that eyewit- nesses were artfully prevented from describing what they really saw and that experts only said what they thought the Commission wanted to hear. The unspoken assumption is that having the professional career and income of an expert witness subjects one to coercion like any gar- den-variety blackmail victim with a mistress or a gambling debt. Having bought the idea that a large number of professionals have acquiesced to a grand deceit, it's only a small step more to accept that the most rotten few have tampered with the physical evidence to make it look all one way. Thus the JFK controversy has yielded a planted bullet, a phony autopsy, a missing street sign with a bullet hole, a switched murder weapon, and even fake wounds in JFK's cadaver to make it look like he was shot from behind. Under the rule of "nothing is what it seems," no evidence is nearly good enough to convict. If there's a photograph of Oswald holding the murder weapon, it's a forgery. If experts declare the photo authentic, it's a damn good forgery. Simpson's defense, confronting a series of public officials and private experts telling different chapters of the same story, faithfully follow the time-tested procedures of conspiracy think, casting each and every official as minions of The Big Lie. Day after day in the trial, minor discrepancies between witnesses, between handwritten and typed notes, between photos and reports, i.e. the customary detritus of the evidentiary record, have been put under a cock-eyed light in order to cast a long shadow across the jury. The witnesses have been com- pelled under ominous cross-examination to confess the smallest of errors, no matter how tangential to the case, lending the proceeding, at times, the air of a Stalinist show trial. The Dream Teamers are too sophisticated to utter the bugaboo word "conspiracy," but if one sums the parts, it's the logic of their position. Harvard Law professor and stealth Dream Teamer, Alan Dershowitz, varnished the concept with a gloss of sociology when he observed, "all cops are taught to lie," as if to tap into the fear that there is nothing particularly unusual about Sim- pson--or any African-American male--being framed for murder with the full cooperation of the LAPD. The charge of evidence tampering has mutated to the implica- tion that the police failed to prevent evidence contamination by lollyg- agging in the puddles of blood. Modern science has come to bear on the issue of blood identification, but science is puny in the face of a power- ful belief. To quiet suspicions that the bullets used in the JFK assassina- tion came from different lots, the material was tested for its elemental composition. To a high probability, the fragments matched, but this was less important to Oswald's defenders than the small margin of error always found in scientific experiments. This debate has risen again with the introduction of DNA blood tests in the Simpson case. The scientists have admitted that the tests, as good as they are, still fall short of molecular infallibility. The defenders may declare victory as they don their fig leaves. The Rosetta stone of the JFK conspiracy theories is a whole bullet found on a stretcher in the hospital where the President and Gov- ernor Connally were taken for treatment. Since the bullet was ballisti- cally linked to Oswald's rifle, it logically qualifies as evidence. But since it hit bone and remained relatively undamaged, conspiracy hunt- ers claimed this "Magic Bullet" had been planted to tie Oswald's gun to the assassination. A detailed analysis of the circumstances dispels any mystery over the bullet's condition and, absent that analysis, logic dic- tates that at the time the bullet was discovered, conspirators could not have known whether planting an extraneous bullet would expose their plot by queering the evidence. If all of this is starting to feel like a bad case of deja vu, it's because we really are in the same place again. The spectre of planted evidence has rematerialized in the Simpson case. Detective Fuhrman's discovery in the back of Simpson's estate has not been dubbed the "Magic Glove" but as "The Bloody Glove," it has a name that conveys terrible secrets to anyone tuned in on the conspiracy wavelength. The mundane reality is the same for bullet and glove. The glove has been linked to the victims of the crime and the perpetrator, as the stretcher bullet was. But that is something of a formality regarding the issue of planting. As with a wayward bullet, there is no chance Fuhrman could have known how a misplaced glove would affect the totality of the evi- dence. Experts scoff at these skirmishes, as regular folk might at for- eign tourists disputing the dimes to a dollar. It is the fact finders who know the machinery of crime detection. For the majority of us sitting in the cheap seats facing a wall and a television set, these high-profile cases are less about crime solution--which often seems like a sideshow- -and more like a stage where philosophical schisms in society turn into shadow boxing forms: black vs. white, strong vs. weak, honesty vs. corruption. The JFK assassination provides an elaborate model of how controversy can spiral away from the core facts of a case. When the public wants more--or more satisfying--answers than officialdom can give, discontent prospers, the door is opened to fantasists, the construc- tion of the pseudo-history underway, and the splitting of perceived real- ity among factions begun. Following this model, it's a safe prediction that disgruntlement will extend beyond the end of the Simpson affair. No one wants Simpson to be guilty, and sadness would surely greet that outcome. Whereas the Oswald indictment created controversy revolv- ing around the issue of government secrecy, a Simpson conviction would likely provoke a charge more peculiar to Simpson's situation, that racism prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial. To be fair, though, if Simpson is acquitted, feminists will step up to the mike to note society's coddling of wife beaters. Three decades later, the JFK debate still heats up on occasion. The assassination is widely but naively perceived as a turning point in American life, ending a mythical era of innocence and triggering a new era of cynicism and official corruption. For some, November 22, 1963 is the day the government became the enemy of the people. The Simp- son trial most certainly lacks that potency. Though it has reinforced fears by African-Americans of police discrimination, no new ground appears to have been broken outside of each day's novel legal tactic. And if Simpson is found guilty, it's hard to imagine a stronger reaction than what followed the first Rodney King verdict over an essentially similar issue. In the future, we will most likely remember this contro- versy for the fame of the defendant, the record-breaking news cover- age, and the void that followed the close of the tale. ---